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1                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
No. 07-4621
_________
LI QIN ZHOU,
                                                                            Petitioner.
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                         Respondent
______________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A77 998 275)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald V. Ferlise
_____________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on June 11, 2009
Before: McKEE, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 3, 2009)
_________
O P I N I O N
_________
PER CURIAM
Li Qin Zhou, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in April
22002.  She appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and conceded that she was
removable for entering without a valid entry document.  See Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)].  Zhou applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), on the ground that she suffered persecution in China as a Falun Gong
practitioner.  In particular, Zhou claimed that she practiced Falun Gong for one month –
attending one or two meetings and handing out fliers – before the practice was officially
banned.  Fearing arrest, Zhou went to live with a friend in another town.  The authorities
came to her parents’ home and, because they were unable to locate Zhou, detained and
“mistreated” her father for four months.  The IJ denied relief, finding Zhou’s allegations
not credible because of implausibilities and inconsistencies in her airport statement, her
credible fear interview, her asylum affidavit, and her testimony.  The IJ also concluded
that Zhou could safely relocate in China and faulted her for failing to provide
corroborating evidence.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed without
opinion.
Zhou filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.  By order entered November 27, 2007, the Second Circuit transferred the
petition for review to this Court.  We have jurisdiction under INA § 242 [8 U.S.C.
§ 1252].  Because the BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ without opinion, we examine
the decision of the IJ.  See Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).  We
      The provisions of the Real ID Act of 2005 that address the Court’s review of an1
adverse credibility finding do not apply in this case because Zhou applied for relief before
the Act’s effective date.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).
3
review the factual findings of the IJ, including adverse credibility findings, for substantial
evidence.  See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under this standard,
the IJ’s determinations will be upheld if they are supported by “reasonable, substantial
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft,
338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).  Adverse credibility
determinations based on speculation or conjecture are not upheld.  See Gao v. Ashcroft,
299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  In general, “minor inconsistencies and minor
admissions” are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding.  Id.  Any
discrepancies must involve the heart of the claim.   Id.  Furthermore, we must uphold a1
determination regarding the availability of corroborating evidence unless “a reasonable
trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 
INA § 242(b)(4) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)]; see also Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246,
252 (3d Cir 2009).
The IJ concluded that Zhou was not credible because she “testified that there were
between 10 and 20 people present [at the Falun Gong meetings she attended] . . . [t]hen
. . . almost immediately changed the testimony, and stated that there were between 20 and
30 people present.”  The IJ also found it “quite incredible” that Zhou could not recall the
name of the person who led the meetings.  Furthermore, Zhou testified that she lived with
4a friend in the town of Zhi Cheng for two years before coming to the United States, but
her asylum application and airport statement listed Changle City as her last address in
China.  The IJ rejected Zhou’s explanation that she provided her parents’ permanent
address in Changle City because the questions were not clear.  The IJ also faulted Zhou
for alleging in her credible fear interview that Chinese authorities had destroyed her
house, omitting that claim from her asylum application, and then explaining that it was
the fence that was destroyed and that she did not include it in her application because
“that’s not major.”  Finally, without citing any evidence, the IJ saw “no reason why the
police . . . in China would be so interested in the respondent inasmuch as she only
practiced Falun Gong for a month or less.”  
We believe that these adverse credibility determinations are not supported by
substantial evidence.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the IJ reasonably required Zhou to
provide corroboration for her claims.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551-54 (3d
Cir. 2001) (observing that even where an applicant is credible, corroboration may be
required if the applicant is to meet his burden of proof).  In denying relief based on a lack
of corroboration, the IJ must conduct the following three-part inquiry:  (1) an
identification of facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry as
to whether the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if
she has not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained her failure
to do so.  See Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir.2006).  Zhou provided no
5corroborating evidence of her practice of Falun Gong.  The IJ noted that Zhou could have
submitted letters from friends or family in China, books that she read in the United States,
or the testimony of her uncle, who lived with her at the time of the hearing.  Although
Zhou stated that her family “do[es] not have much education,” she did not adequately
explain why she did not produce the Falun Gong literature or arrange for her uncle to
testify.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
IJ’s determination that Zhou failed to meet her burden of showing that she is eligible for
asylum and withholding of removal.  The IJ also correctly determined that Zhou did not
meet the criteria for relief under the CAT because she failed to establish that it was more
likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to China.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16,
208.18. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
